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Abstract - DNS is a basic Internet service which almost all
other  user  services  depend  on.  However,  what  has  been
perceived in practice are a lot of inconsistencies and errors in
the  configuration  of  servers  that  cause  different  problems.
The majority of such cases are included in this research with
the aim of identifying and classifying the major problems of
DNS  availability,  performance  and  security.  In  order  to
analyze  these  problems  in  correlation  with  DNS
administrators  working  practice,  we  have  developed  a
methodology and tool for testing, quantifying and analysis of
DNS  misconfigurations.  The  methodology  and  tool  were
applied on three heterogeneous domain categories – the most
popular  Internet  domains,  academic  domains  and  one
national top level domain. Our results confirm relatively high
percentage  of  misconfigured  domains,  especially  in  the
academic  and national  categories.  However,  we have shown
that  fixing  the  configuration  on relatively  small  number  of
name servers can have significant impact to great number of
domains. Proper domain management, permanent testing and
collaboration  with  other  administrators  are  identified  as
measures  to  improve  domains  operation,  stability  and
security. 
Index  Terms  –  DSN,  Domain  Name  System,  Testing,
Misconfigurations,  Troubleshooting,  Public  Zone  Transfer,
Public Recursion.
I. INTRODUCTION
DNS  is  a  global  scale  hierarchical  service,  which
primary role is to resolve domain names on the Internet in
order  to  facilitate  easier  mapping  to  device  IP addresses
across the network [1].  Due to the  need  for  service  high
availability, DNS system is managed in a fully distributed
and  redundant  manner,  by  configuring  one  or  more  so-
called  secondary  servers,  which  contain  copies  of  the
domain  definitions  (zone  files)  from  the  primary  server.
Both primary and secondary name servers are authoritative
and completely equivalent for the resolution of DNS for the
same domain. 
Though defined back in 1983 [2], there are still certain
problems in the correct application of servers [1]. Since the
changes  in  computer  networks  are  very  dynamic,  DNS
configurations  need  a  constant  maintenance  and  frequent
update: new names and IP addresses are added or removed,
servers are added or changed, new subdomains are opened,
etc. For that reason DNS service is configured a distributed
system  which  requires  coordinated  work  of  many
administrators  who  are  often  physically  separate  and
belong to different  institutions or organizational  domains.
Therefore,  each  change  can  lead  to  potential  errors,
especially  those  changes  which  need  to  be  done
simultaneously in multiple domains, such as configuration
of secondary servers or servers on the parent level. 
Some  problems  with  DNS configuration  can  easily  be
noticed  because  they  influence  the  availability  of  the
application  service  (e.g.  server  non-authoritativeness),
others  influence  efficiency,  reliability  or  domain  security
(e.g.  Public  Zone  Transfer),  while  some  problems  only
occur  occasionally  or stay hidden until  more problematic
errors appear.
Our motivation to extend the research in this area was to
raise awareness about DNS configuration  importance  and
help DNS administrators  to better  manage their  domains.
The  objective  was  to  identify  the  most  frequent  DNS
misconfigurations,  analyze  their  implications  to
availability,  performance  and  security  in  correlation  to
working  practice  of  DNS  administrators.  We  have
contributed to this goal by providing methodology and tool
for  testing,  quantifying  and  analysis  of  DNS
misconfigurations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
makes and overview of published related work. Section 3
defines  the  methodology  used  for  single  domain  testing.
Section  4  presents  the  results  of  the  massive  testing  of
domains in three chosen datasets. Section 5 concludes our
research and underlines the directions on our further work. 
II.RELATED WORK
Few studies have so far dealt with the potential causes of
DNS  problems  and  domain  testing  with  the  aim  of
acquiring  statistical  data  to  indicate  the  real-life
functionality  [3].  DNS  have  been  tested  by  clients  on
different physical locations and, according to the gathered
data, 26% of the names are defined in the CNAME record
[4]. Therefore, the longest chain of their resolution can be
as much as 4 steps long. Research has been done on DNS
problem  causes  and  they  have  been  classified  (lame
delegation, reduced redundancy, Cyclic Zone Dependency)
[5][6]. The problem of DNS security which occurs due to
an incomplete Glue record has also been pointed out [7].
There  are  project  that  have  tested  DNS capability  on
large number of domains from client side [7], or ISP side
[8]. Results show tested DNS capability like Glue record,
Mixed-case,  EDNS,  DNSSEC,  NXDOMAIN,  recursion,
port prediction, IPv6, SPF, DKIM.
In the paper [9]  authors have combined  different  DNS
capability tests like Public Zone Transfer (PZT), DNSSEC,
locality,  etc,  and presented  statistics  for  large  number  of
domains (about 60% of all domains).
Certain  papers  have  also  made  a  contribution  by
quantifying domains response and presenting  it  as metric
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[6].  They have  defined  MSQ (Minimal  number  of server
queries) metric and conclude that average MSQ is 3.48 and
about 60% of tested domains had 3 or less MSQ.
Most of the related researches consider partial issues of
DNS functionality,  performed in different time during the
last  decade.  They  are  pointing  out  a  significant  DNS
misconfiguration,  but there were no comprehensive cause
analyses of these problems. Having in mind rapid increase
of domains on the Internet  (from 21 thousand in January
1993  [10]  to  270  million  in  November  2013  [11])
occasional  testing  DNS  configuration  on  the  Internet
domains is still required. 
Our  research  aims  to  fill  this  gap  by  defining  a
methodology for comprehensive domain testing, metric to
quantify quality of individual domains, and analysis which
was  demonstrated  on  three  different  heterogenic  domain
datasets. 
III. DOMAIN TESTING METHODOLOGY 
A.  Single domain analysis
In  the  first  phase  of  our  research,  a  web  based  java
application for single domain analysis has been developed
using  open-source  project  dnsjava  [12].  The  application
tests the given domain, starting from all root name servers
and tracing down all the paths throughout DNS hierarchy,
ending  with  the  servers  authoritative  for  the  domain.
During this process all relevant DNS parameters from each
server  on  the  paths  are  collected  and  tested  regarding
compliance  to  the  standards,  recommendations  and  best
practice.  The results are systematically presented using an
interactive  web  based  graphical  interface,  pointing  out
errors,  warning  and  notifications.  The  application  is
publicly available as an on-line service for domain testing
under the name NetVizura DNS Checker [13].
B. Domain tests
Based on the insight into testing results of many public
domains  obtained  using  the  application  described  above,
and  by  analyzing  functional  characteristics  of  the  DNS
service,  the  most  important  tests  which  indicate  DNS
service malfunctioning, have been identified as follows:
 Name  server  is  unavailable  via  UDP -  Domain  has
correctly registered authoritative name server both on
parent  level  and domain  level  itself,  but  at  least  one
domain name server is unavailable via UDP protocol.
If the server  is selected for the name resolution,  this
malfunction  results  to  time  out  period,  which  slows
down the system response from the user perspective.
Which  server  is  going  to  be  included  in  the  query
resolution process is out of the user control. Therefore,
the system response is unpredictable and it takes from
a few milliseconds in a regular case to a few seconds
when the unavailable server is selected.
 Name server is unavailable via TCP - Domain has at
least  one  name server  which  is unavailable  via  TCP
protocol  for  the  user  resolutions.  TCP  protocol  is
considered  as  required  part  of  full  DNS  protocol
implementation  [14].  Its  implementation  is necessary
when the response exceeds 512-byte limit, which is the
case  with zone transfer,  when the  number  of  servers
(NS  records)  is  higher  than  6,  or  with  DNSSEC
responses.  Otherwise,  lack  of  TCP support  does  not
result  to any problem,  and it  is not  considered  as an
error. 
 Only one authoritative name server – Domain has only
one  authoritative  name  server,  and  therefore  it  is
exposed  to  a  single  point  of  failure  problem.  Even
though domain registration process usually requires at
least  two  different  authoritative  name  servers,  it
happens  often  that  these  two  servers  are  paired  via
CNAME record, both referring to the same IP address.
Another scenario which leads to this problem is when
the secondary name server never gets configured as a
secondary server,  or it  stops working as a secondary.
Consequently, when this name server is involved in the
resolution,  it  sends  non-authoritative  response  which
results to slower resolution. 
 Non-authoritative name servers defined on the parent
level  – Domain has correctly  defined name server  on
the  parent  level,  but  it  is  not  authoritative  for  the
domain. From the user perspective, this problem leads
to timeout, redirection and repeated query which slows
down  the  resolution  process  and  degrades  the  user
experience.  However,  the  probability  of  an
unsuccessful  query  in  this  case  depends  on  the  total
number of servers defined on the parent level  for the
given domain.  Having small  number of name servers
defined  at  the  parent  level  (2  or  3)  gives  results  to
greater probability of failed queries (50% or 33%). 
 “Stealth” name servers – Domain has an authoritative
name server defined on the domain zone, but it is not
registered on any parent server. Even though this name
server  functions  properly,  having  parent  servers
unaware  of  its  existence,  it  is  therefore  “stealth”  for
the  rest  of  DNS  service  and  useless  for  the  name
resolution. 
 Loops in the resolution process - Resolution loop can
occur  when name server  on the  parent  level  redirect
request to the domain name server which appear to be
non-authoritative  for  the  domain,  and  then  return
reference  back  to  the  parent  domain.  The  resolution
process  is  slower  down,  but  users  and  domain
administrators generally are not aware of the problem. 
 Enabled Public Zone Transfer - Public Zone Transfer
means  that  everyone  is  allowed  to  access  and  copy
whole  domain  content  from  name  server,  which
potentially enables hackers to conduct Reconnaissance
attacks  [2].  Although  the  majority  of  authoritative
name servers deny the Public Zone Transfer, only one
name server with this option enabled is enough to put
the whole domain security in danger. 
 Enabled  Public  Recursive–  When  a  name  server
supports public Recursive Resolution, any user can use
it  for DNS resolution.  It  exposes the server  to DDoS
attack and increases the risk of the domain functioning
being disrupted. These servers may be used to conduct
DDoS  attacks  to  other  name  servers  since  a  single
request  by client  can generate multiple requests from
this name server to other name servers [15].
 Synchronization  with  the  secondary  servers –
Synchronization problem occur when some secondary
name servers failed to download data from the primary
name server.  This problem can result to resolution of
inconsistent DNS data.
 Close  physical  locations  of  name  servers –  The
requirement of multiple name server per zone is made
for purpose of redundancy. However, it is not rare that
all name servers are located at the same local network.
Paper [16] describes that  domains with week-spots at
Dependency  Graphs  can  be  easily  jeopardized  with
attack  on  small  number  of  servers.  In  this  case  the
domain is faced with a potential single point of failure
(the local network), which increases the risk of service
malfunction.
 Reverse  mapping -  PTR  record  enables  reverse
resolving IP address to symbolic names. Many security
aspects,  like  SPF  (Sender  Policy  Framework)  [17],
today lean on forward/reverse technique for checking
the correctness of DNS records, which can still cause
problems on a large number of domains.
 IPv6  support –  The  support  for  IPv6  is  tested  by
checking  AAAA  record  of  NS,  MX  and  WWW
records.  Defining  AAAA  records  for  name  servers
which do not have the IPv6 support slows down query
resolution  because  the  request  for  resolution  is  first
sent via IPv6 protocol, and only when an error occurs,
it is sent via IPv4 protocol (Dual Stack solution for the
transition to IPv6).
 DNSSEC support – Support for secured DNS protocol
prevents some of integrity attack on DNS. In this case
each domain is tested for protected NS and A records.
However, in full DNSSSEC support all zones from the
root  to  the  bottom  have  to  support  and  implement
DNSSEC [18]. 
C. Domain state quantifying metric
To  quantify  domain  state,  as  a  consequence  of  DNS
misconfiguration,  the  results  obtained  from  the  tests
described in the text above, need to be transformed into a
single metric. 
Firstly,  testing  domain  d with  the  test  i gives  results
Ti(d), defined as follows:
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However,  these testing indicators have different  impact
to  domain  functionality.  Some  problems  affect  basic
functionality  and  they  are  critical  to  domain  operation,
such  as  problems  with  authoritativeness,  while  others
influence reliability, leading to a single point of failure, or
efficiency  which  results  to  unstable  service  response.
Public Zone Transfer and Public Recursion expose domains
to  serious  security  vulnerabilities.  Other  tests  do  not
necessarily  imply  malfunction  or  misconfigurations,  but
rather  indicate  the  state  of  domain  with  regard  to  new
technology penetration (IPv6 and DNSSEC) or reflect DNS
administrators’ principle that can be included in the metric
with minor impact.
Quantifying the  state  of any domain therefore  assumes
the  Weight  factor which  reflects  the  relevance  of  test  i,
denoted  as  Wi.  We  have  chosen  the  scale  from 0 to  10,
where greater Weight factor means more problematic state
of  the domain,  while  0 means that  the  test  is effectively
skipped  from  the  metric.  Values  of  the  Weight  factors
chosen in this research are given in the Table 1.
Additionally, there are some tests mostly related to name
servers  operation,  whose  impact  to  the  domain
functionality  directly  depends  on  the  number  of
misconfigured name servers. As an example, if one of five
name  servers  is  unavailable  via  UDP,  the  problem  is
manifested in 20% cases.  In general,  if  Nerr,i(d) of  Ntot,i(d)
name servers for domain  d are in error state against test  i,
the probability of the problem appearance is:
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TABLE 1. WEIGHT FACTORS AND SCALED FACTORS 
No. Test Weight 
Factor
Scaled
Factor
1 Unavailability via UDP 10 S
2 Unavailability via TCP 4 S
3 Domains with only one authoritative
DNS server 8 1
4 Non-authoritative server defined on the
parent level 8 S
5 “Stealth” DNS servers 4 S
6 Loops in the resolution process 6 1
7 Enabled Public Zone Transfer 5 1
8 Enabled public recursive resolution 5 S
9 Synchronization with the secondary
servers 2 1
10 Close physical locations of DNS servers 2 1
11 Incorrect reverse mapping (PTR record) 2 1
12 IPv6 support 2 1
13 DNSSEC support 2 1
In most cases, there are 2 or 3 name servers per domain
[9][19] and typically only one misconfigured server when
the  problem  exists,  which  gives  50%  or  33%  of  the
problem  appearances  respectively.  Obviously,  these
Weight  factors  need  to  be scaled  with the  probability  of
problem  appearance  from  the  user  perspective.  If  we
dimension the maximum Weight factor for the case where
the error appears with 50% probability (1 of 2 name servers
is misconfigured) or even higher (3 of 4 name servers are
misconfigured,  which  is possible  but  very  rare  case),  we
can  involve  the  Scaled  factor for  test  i and  domain  d,
denoted Si(d), as follows:
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Tests  which  involve  the  Scaled  factor  are  marked  in
Table 1 with label  S  in the last column,  while other tests
have Scaled factor of 1.
Finally,  the  total  quantifying  metric  for  domain  d,
denoted  M(d), is sum of the Weight factors scaled by the
Scaled factor for each test which returns error state, given
by the following equation: 
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In order to have the metric in the chosen range from 0 to
10, it  needs to be normalized  by the maximum measured
metric (Mmax) and the maximum chosen value (10):
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M
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where maximum metric is given by:
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D. Domain testing tool
Based  on  the  testing  methodology  and  quantifying
metric,  we  have  developed  the  application  for  massive
domain testing, in order to analyse operation, performances
and security issues of huge number of domains. Besides the
module for testing individual domains, the application also
includes the following modules: scheduler for domain tests,
central database, portal for domain organization and result
displaying, and module for the analysis of test results.
 The scheduler takes domains from the central database,
testing  it  using  the  basic  testing  module  and  saves  the
results  into  the  database.  The  testing  intensity  was
dimensioned  not  to  be  too  “aggressive”  for  individual
servers. Therefore the module for scheduling is configured
to test one domain per second, randomly choosing the order
of domains for testing. 
The  analysis  module  prepares  analytical  reports  of
testing  results  from  the  database,  while  the  web  portal
allows  domain  management,  data  organization  and  the
result reporting. 
E. Domain datasets
In order to measure DNS misconfiguration and correlate
it to the working practice of DNS administrators, we have
chosen three very different groups of domains, i.e. datasets.
The  first  dataset  includes  domains  of  research  and
education institutions which belong to European  National
Research  and  Education  Networks  (NREN).  Total  of
11,263 domains were gathered from 30 NRENs willing to
participate  in  the  research.  The  academic  community  is
traditionally characterized by an open collaboration among
the  staff,  both  internally  within  the  country  or
internationally  between  NRENs.  In  this  dataset  we
expected  to  find  more  distributed  DNS  structure  with
seamless collaboration of DNS administrators.
The second dataset includes all domains of “.rs” ccTLD,
which belongs to Republic  of Serbia.  Serbia is a country
with middle level  of Internet  penetration were about 53%
of households have the Internet  connection  in 2013 [20].
The dataset with total of 57,004 domains was provided by
the  Serbian  National  Internet  Domain  Registry - RNIDS,
which  partially  sponsored  this  research.  They  belong  to
wide range of customers,  such as commercial  companies,
non-profit  organizations,  or  individuals.  Domains  are
registered  and usually hosted  by the authorized  registers,
which are mostly ISP companies. They are competitors on
the market with less willingness to collaborate, even on the
technical matters. 
The  third  dataset  consists  of  1,000  the  most  popular
domains, according to [21]. Majority of them are domains
under “.com” domain and many ccTLD (64.3% .com, 5.1%
.net, 1.8% .org, and other different ccTLD). Since these are
popular  and  frequently  used  domains  it  is  expected  that
they  are  supported  by  more  professional  DNS
administration.
The purpose of massive domain testing and analysis is to
compare DNS misconfiguration within these three different
categories of domains, labelled as NREN, ccTLD and Top
in the rest of the text. 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The  domain  testing  and  analysis  of  the  results  were
performed on October, 2014. The testing of a total number
of 79,933 domains lasted for about 40 hours. During this
process, a certain number of domains were unavailable due
to  the  impossibility  of  finding  the  authoritative  servers
related  to  these  domains  (6.44%  of  the  NREN domains,
17.41% of the ccTLD domains and 0.4% of Top domains).
These  were  either  incorrectly  registered  domains  or
domains  whose  subscription  had  expired,  and  therefore
were excluded from the analysis.
The rest of the section presents summary results of tests
performed  on  the  most  important  indicators,  stated  in
chapter  3,  simultaneously  for  three  different  domain
datasets. 
Fig. 1.  Problem of unavailability via UDP protocol
A. Unavailable via UDP protocol
Around 9% of NREN domains, 5.2% of Top and, 2% of
ccTLD domains have  at  least  one server  which  does not
respond to UDP queries, as shown in Fig. 1. Comparing to
all existing name servers in these three groups about 4.76%
of  NREN,  1.23%  of  ccTLD  and  2.41%  of  Top  name
servers were unavailable via UDP protocol. The reasons for
domain unavailability via UDP protocol may be temporary
(e.g.  a  server  or  a  network  are  not  functioning  at  the
moment),  or permanent  (e.g.  a  badly configured name or
address of a name server on the parent level). In any case,
those name servers cannot respond to any DNS request.
B. Unavailable via TCP protocol
The results gathered by testing DNS availability via TCP
protocol  show  that  around  28.6%  of  ccTLD,  15.9%  of
NREN and nearly 29% od Top servers do not respond to
TCP queries (Fig. 2).
The most frequent causes of DNS service unavailability
via  TCP  protocol  occur  when  a  network  firewall  or  the
server  itself  explicitly  denies  TCP queries,  allowing only
TCP communication with the secondary servers to perform
synchronization.
C.
Domains  with  only  one  authoritative  serverAlthough
minimal  number  of  authoritative  name  servers  for  any
domain should be two, there is a significant  number  of
domains in all  datasets that  have only one authoritative
name server: more then 6% of NREN, 3.67% of ccTLD,
and 3.82% of Top domains (Fig. 3.).
Our research shows that 50% of NREN domains, 70.18%
of  Top  and  only  31.97%  of  ccTLD  domains  have  more
than  2 name servers,  while  57.93% Top,  18.58% NREN
and  16.42%  of  ccTLD  domains  have  more  than  three
servers. It is pointed out in the research from 2009 [5] that
65% of domains have only two authoritative servers, while
20% have three or more servers. Only Top domains, which
are mostly business driven, are above that average.
D. Domains with non-authoritative server defined on the 
parent level
Fig. 4 shows that almost 5% of NREN domains have at
lease  one  non-authoritative  name  servers  defined  on  the
parent  domain,  which  are  significantly  higher  results
comparing to 1.1% of ccTLD and 1.2% of Top domains. 
Taking  into account  the number  of name servers  for  a
domain,  the  probability  of  unsuccessful  query,  which  is
sent to non-authoritative server, is about 40%. In that case
the query has to be repeated to another server. 
Fig. 4.  Problem of non-authoritative servers defined on the parent level
E.  Domains with “Stealth” Servers
According  to  Fig.  5,  the  problem  of  stealth  servers  is
equally  presented  in  all  datasets  -  over  8%  of  domains.
Those servers are authoritive but not used in the resolution
process. 
This indicates that domain administrators are not aware
of  the  problem,  which  increases  the  risk  of  the  domain
failure. Therefore, it is necessary for domain administrators
to  correctly  register  name  servers  on the  parent  domain.
This  also  demonstrates  the  need  for  much  better
collaboration between DNS administrators, especially with
the administrators on the parent level.
Fig 5.  Problem of “stealth” Servers
F. Domains with loops in the resolution process
Loops in the resolution process were detected in 2.63%
of  NREN  domains,  0.44%  of  ccTLD  and  0.7%  of  Top
domains (Fig. 6). Even though we are dealing with a rather
small percentage of domains with detected loop error, these
errors considerably  slow down the resolution process and
they might make the domain unavailable due to the timeout
period.
The solution to this problem can be found in increasing
the responsiveness of domain administrators so that a non-
authoritative  server  wouldn’t  be  defined  in  the  parent
domain.
G.
Enabled Public Zone TransferIt is alarming that there are
15% of NREN domains, 9.6% of all ccTLD domains, and
4% of Top domains have Public Zone Transfer enabled
on at least one name server (Fig. 7). 
Initial  testing,  conducted  in  2012,  showed  that  about
22.7% domains in ccTLD dataset  had PZT enabled on at
least  one  server.  In  2012,  we  have  established
communication  with  ccTLD.  During  2013,  Serbian
National  Internet  Domain  Register  -  RNDIS  [23]  have
managed to significantly improve state of ccTLD domains
using results of our research. 
H. Enabled Public Recursive 
Fig. 8 shows that almost 6% of NREN domains, 1% of
ccTLD domains and  2.2% of Top domains  have  at  least
one server which enables Public Recursive. 
Comparing to the initial testing of ccTLD domains from
2012, where this type of error was presented in 12.8% of
all national domains, the latest result clearly demonstrate a
significant  improvement  that  can  be  done  by  the
coordinated and collaborative DNS administration. 
I. Problem with the synchronization of secondary 
servers 
During the testing, a relatively small number of domains
Fig. 2.  Problem of unavailability via
TCP protocol
Fig. 3.  Domains with only
one authoritative server
Fig. 6.  Problem of domains
with  a loop in the resolution
process
Fig. 7.  Problem of enabled Public
Zone Transfer
(less  than  1%)  had  a  problem  with  the  synchronization
between  the  primary  and  secondary  servers,  which  is
shown in Fig. 9. 
Fig. 8.  Problem of public recursion Fig. 9.  Problem with the
synchronization of secondary
servers
J. Problem of close physical locations of servers
The  results  shown in  Fig.  10  indicate  that  50.44%  of
ccTLD domains most probably have closely located name
servers,  which is detected by the same IP network with a
24-bit mask. The reason for such a great percentage lays in
the  fact  that  ccTLD  domains  are  usually  hosted  by
authorized  local  registers  or  Internet  providers.  It  also
indicates  the need  for a  better  cooperation between local
Internet  providers  and  authorized  registers  in  the  mutual
distribution of hosting services.
The situation is much better in NREN dataset (18.25%),
which  indicates  that  academic  institutions  are  ready  to
provide DNS hosting to each other. 
Top domains  in  just  about  5.95% of cases  have  name
servers in same network.
Increasing number  of name servers located  in different
ISPs,  physical  network,  counties  or  continents,  decrease
chance of  name service unavailability and prevent single
point of failure.
Fig. 10.  Problem of close physical
locations of server
Fig 11.  IPv6 support
K. Incorrect reverse mapping (PTR record)
Reverse  DNS records  were  tested  for  all  unique  name
servers. The results shown in Fig. 12 present that 41,7% of
NREN domains,  39,7% of ccTLD and over  45% of Top
domains do not have PTR record at all. For those domains
that  have reverse record 5.3% of NREN servers,  2.8% of
ccTLD, and more then 20% of Top servers are unavailable
via their names (they are referred to non-existing domains).
Around  4.8%  of  NREN,  3.8% ccTLD  and  7.9%  of  Top
domains servers have a reverse DNS record which do not
match  with  a  forward  DNS  record  (e.g.  they  use  alias
(CNAME)  records,  or  many  domain  names  are  being
resolved  to  the  same  IP  address  of  the  Server).  The
consistent  reverse  mapping  achieved  at  48.2% of NREN,
53.7% of ccTLD servers, and just 26% of Top domains.
Fig. 12.   Problem of reverse mapping
L. IPv6 support
It  is  worrying  that  a  large  number  of  domains  do  not
have  the  IPv6  support  in  the  form  of  adjusted  AAAA
records, despite the fact that DNS configuration may easily
be adapted to IPv6 protocol. This case is especially seen in
the tested ccTLD which is, comparing to other  countries,
late with the implementation of IPv6 protocol (Fig. 11).
The  biggest  penetration  of  IPv6 protocol  is  with  most
popular  sites.  It  is  slightly  comparable  to  Project  6lab
(results  from  2014.)  which  presents  that  about  28%
domains  support  IPv6 protocol  [22].  That  result  includes
27.84%  of  domains  with  Dual  Stack  (IPv4  and  IPv6)
support and only 0.00053% Native IPv6 support.
M. DNSSEC support
The  testing  results  show  that  the  implementation  of
DNSSEC technology  for  the  DNS service  protection  has
not gone very far which is depicted in Fig. 13. The tested
ccTLD  still  does  not  have  the  DNSSEC  support  on  its
domains, thus the entire implementation on sub-domains is
not possible. Among NREN domains, only 7.9% of parent
domains  support  DNSSEC and  have  made  room  for  the
protocol  support  on  sub-domains.  About  2.4%  of  Top
domains have implemented  from top to bottom DNSSEC
protection.
Independently of the support on parent domains (which
is mandatory  for  the  complete  DNSSEC implementation)
around 1,2% of NREN domains and 11,7% of ccTLD, and
just about 1% of Top domains have servers with configured
DNSSEC support for the protection of NS domain records.
These domains are ready for the completion of DNSSEC
implementation when the parent domain enables DNSSEC
protection.  A  certain  number  of  servers  with  DNSSEC
support  already  support  additional  records,  such  as  A,
AAAA and MX. 
Fig. 13.  DNSSEC support
N. Normalized domain metric distribution
Normalized  domain  metric  is  a  useful  technique  to
measure the operational state of a single domain. To have
an  overview  of  operational  state  of  all  domains  in  the
datasets,  a  cumulative  density  function  (CDF)  of
normalized domain metric is shown in Fig. 14. CDF graph
shows percentage  of domains in the  datasets  which  have
equal or smaller normalized metric that a certain value. It
allows efficient  comparison  of tested  results  for  different
datasets. 
Metric  distribution  graph  shows  that  less  than  1%  of
domains in NREN and Top dataset have passed all of our
tests,  while  none of ccTLD  domains has passed (due to
lack  of  IPv6  and  DNSSEC  implementation  on  ccTLD
level). More than half of all domains have metric less then
1  (50.1%  NREN,  39.8%  ccTLD,  58.9%  Top).  All  tree
dataset  have  about  90%  of  domains  metric  less  then  2
(85.9% NREN, 89.3% ccTLD, 92.1% Top).  Difference  is
notable  up  to  normalized  metric  of  3,  reaching  97%  of
domains in all categories.  
Fig. 14.  Normalized domain metric distribution (CDF)
O.Name server distribution analysis
Since  the  problems of  domain  operation  considered  in
this  research  are  caused  by  the  misconfiguration  of  the
name  servers,  we  have  further  analyzed  the  number  of
domains affected by individual misconfigured name servers
for the specific problem. The purpose of this analysis is to
check how many domains with certain error can be fixed
by correcting configuration on relatively small  number of
name servers. The candidates are those name servers which
host large number of domains. 
Distribution  of  all  name  servers  which  are  non-
authoritative  but  defined  on the  parent  zone  is  shown in
Fig. 15. The result for ccTLD domains depict that there is a
single name server involved in 6% problems of this type. It
means  that  correcting  the  issue  of  non-authoritativeness
with the parent zone for domains on only one name server,
by removing server from the parent zone or reconfiguring it
to become authoritative for the domains, this type of error
can  be  significantly  reduced.  Furthermore,  resolving  this
issue on top 5 name servers in ccTLD dataset, the problem
would  be  reduced  by 24.5%.  This  is  the  consequence  of
hosting  a  large  number  of  domains  on  the  name  server
which are actually misconfigured. 
Greater diversity of name servers for domains in NREN
and  Top  datasets  results  to  lower  concentration  of  this
problem  per  servers,  but  considerable  improvement  can
also be achieved on just a few servers. For NREN domains,
resolving  this  error  on  only  one  server  can  reduce  the
problem by 7.7%, while fixing problem on 5 servers would
resolve  14.8%  domains  with  this  issue.  In  Top  domain
dataset, resolving this issue on top 5 servers would reduce
number of domains with this problem by 4.84%.
The similar misconfiguration with the parent level is the
problem  with  “stealth”  name servers.  Fig.  16 shows that
fixing  top  5  Stealth  name  servers  for  ccTLD  domains
would reduce  the  problem by 27.5%.  In NREN and Top
datasets,  resolving  Stealth  issue  on  top  5  servers  would
reduce this issue by 12% and 7.5% respectively. 
Public  Zone  Transfer  and  Public  Recursion  are  the
security  problems  which  are  caused  only  by  local
misconfiguration on the name server and therefore can be
more easily fixed by proper DNS administration. At ccTLD
dataset  Public  Zone Transfer  on only one name server  is
related to 13% of domain with this error. Disabling Public
zone  transfer  on  5  top  name  servers  would  resolve  this
security issue for 35.34% affected domains. In NREN and
Top domain datasets, top 5 name servers cover 15.48% and
3.7% domains exposed to this security issue (Fig. 17).
When it comes to Public Recursion, disabling this issue
on only five name servers for domains in ccTLD dataset
would decrease the problem by 11.18%, as it is shown in
Fig. 18.  Disabling Public Recursion on top 5 name servers
in  NREN and  Top  domain  dataset  can  improve  security
issue of 18% and 3% affected domains respectively. 
 
Fig. 15. Server distribution for Not-authoritative but defined on parent
Fig. 16. Server distribution for Stealth issue
 
Fig. 17. Server distribution for Public Zone Transfer
 
Fig. 18.  Server distribution for Public Recursion issue
V.CONCLUSION
By  analyzing  individual  problems  occurring  in  DNS
configurations  we  have  identified  the  most  frequent
problems  and  classified  them  into  13  types  of  tests  to
indicate  DNS  proper  functionality.  Based  on  these
indicators  we  have  defined  an  efficient  methodology  to
measure,  monitor,  compare  and  analyse  domains’  state.
The methodology is also simple and flexible,  which gives
the  possibility  to  adjust  the  importance  of  measured
indicators  changing  the  Weight  factors  according  to  the
domain purpose.  For example,  if  a domain security  is an
issue  of  higher  importance,  the  Weight  factor  of  Public
Zone  Transfer  and  Public  Recursion,  which  affect  a
security, can be increased. 
Similar  to  previous  research  reported  in  the  literature,
our  work  confirms  that  DNS misconfiguration  is  still  an
open issue.  There  are  a  considerable  number  of  domains
which  have  some  problem  with  the  name  server
malfunction  (25.2%  of  NREN,  22.54%  of  ccTLD  and
17.7% of Top domains have problem with either  none or
one  authoritive  server,  loop,  or  non authoritive  server  on
parent, or non accessible servers via UDP and TCP ports).
These  domains show a lower  resolution  performance  and
threatened service reliability. 
Along  with  the  proper  domain  administration  on  the
primary  name  server,  the  collaboration  with  other  DNS
administrators is necessarily for correct domain functioning
and  operation,  what  appears  to  be  the  weakest  point  in
domain maintenance. As an example,  it is useless to deny
Public Zone Transfer on the primary name servers as long
as there is only one secondary name server which allows it.
Despite  the fact  that  it  is relatively easy to check and fix
PZT and Public  Recursion issue problem (even  by email
correspondence),  18.6% of  NREN,  10.2% of ccTLD  and
6%  of  Top  domains  are  exposed  to  this  security
vulnerabilities. 
But  the  most  critical  problems  are  related  to  the
authority  of  name  servers  and  registration  on  the  parent
level. Therefore, a coordinated and synchronized work with
the  parent  level  is  of  special  importance.  If  this
collaboration  failed  during domain  registration  or  on any
changes during domain management, the resolution process
will  lead  to  non-authoritative  servers,  or  contrary,  some
authoritative name servers can stay hidden, i.e. “stealth”. 
Although the collaboration in the academic community
is a widely accepted practice,  a large percentage of errors
show that  it  does not  always follow a dynamic  nature  of
domain  changes.  Many  domains  in  ccTLD  category  are
also suffer from misconfiguration, but still less than those
in academic  community.   Significantly  lower  errors  with
the most popular domains ensure that DNS management is
a professional business driven process, what is the case in
commercial sector. 
The analysis of name servers involved in the individual
problems shows that misconfiguration on one name server
most  probably  affects  all  hosted  domains.  Consequently,
we  have  shown  that  the  problems  can  be  significantly
minimized by fixing the configuration on relatively small
number  of  name  servers.  This  is  especially  remarkable
when large number of domains is concentrated on several
name servers, what is the case with the local registers and
ISP companies within ccTLD. 
And  finally,  in  addition  to  careful  technical  domain
maintenance  and  synchronized  work  with  other
administrators,  a  permanent  monitoring  and  testing  is  of
outmost  importance.  We  contributed  to  this  task  by
providing an on-line service for individual domain testing
[13],  which  offers  an  opportunity  to  check,  analyse  and
isolate DNS misconfiguration problems.
The  further  research  will  focus  on  permanent  DNS
monitoring  system  and  its  impact  to  reduction  of  DNS
misconfiguration over the time.
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